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Pl ai nti ff-Appe,11 ant', 
vs, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
18224 
· This is an action for reinstatement to the staff of the Attorney 
General's office pursuant to Sec. 67-5-11 of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
based on plaintiff's status as a career attorney prior to his election 
as the Attorney General. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed by the Attorney General's office in November 
1968 (R. 2). On May 30, 1975, he was placed on probationary career 
status (R. 7). On January 16, 1976, he achieved permanent career 
status (R. 8). Plaintiff became the Attorney General of Utah in 
January, 1977, as a result of being so elected in November, 1976 (R. 2). 
After defendant became Attorney Genera 1 in January, 1981 , as a result of 
being elected Attorney General in November, 1980, the plaintiff sought on 
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various occasions to exercise his right to reinstatement on the Attorney 
General 1s staff and was ultimately denied (R. 9). 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 24, 1981 (R. 10, ll). 
On December 22, 1981, that motion was granted and an order was made dis-
missing the complaint with prejudice (R. 80, 81). The grounds for the 
dismissal were not specified but the dismissal order referred to the 
memoranda submitted by both parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the order referred to above vacated and the 
case remanded to the lower court to try any factual issues involved in 
this case and to order judgment on the merits in accordance with the facts 
and the law. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE REINSTATED TO THE STAFF 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BASED ON SEC. 67-5-11, U.C.A. 1953. 
Appellant asserts that his right to be reinstated to the staff of the 
Attorney General is expressly provided for in Sec. 67-5-ll which states: as 
follows: 
An attorney in a career status accepting appointment to 
a position in state government which is exempt from the merit 
provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 67 shall upon termination of 
such appointment or employment,unless he is discharged for 
cause, be reinstated in the career status in the office of the 
attorney general at a salary not less than that which he was 
receiving at the time of his appointment, and the time spent 
in such other position shall be credited toward his seniority in 
the career service. (Emphasis added.) 
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Respondent contends that the above cited statute is not applicable to 
appellant because he was serving in an elected position prior to the ter-
mination of his term. Respondent also contends that the key term in Sec. 
67-5-11 is "appointment." Appellant submits that the key phrase is "a~:Ppoint­
ment or employment" which clearly includes elected as well as appointed 
career attorneys. By isolating the term 11 appointment11 out of context 
respondent has erroneously restricted the scope of the statute. 
Respondent contends that appellant's cause turns on the alleged neces-
sity of adding the words "or is elected" to U.c.A. 67-5-11. Appellant 
insists that no such addition to the statute is necessary and relies upon the 
express alternative phrase 11 or employment ... , " which phrase the 
respondent totally ignored in his initial memorandum (R. 12-31). In his 
response memorandum respondent says that the meaning of "or employment" means 
"that employment engaged in by the attorney in the position to which he 
accepted appointment 11 (R 58). In other words, "or employment 11 means the same 
as Happointment" Which then renders tiJem redundant and thus meaningless. 
No principle of statutory construction is more fundamental than that 
which requires a comprehensive interpretation which gives meaning to each 
word or term used in the context of the balance of the statute. Here 
respondent's construction gives no meaning to the underlined alternative 
in " ... appointment or employment.'' The phrase " .•. appointment or 
employment ... 11 can only be consistently read with the balance of the 
statute by treating the words 11 • • • or emp 1 oyment . . . 11 as altering 
the earlier recited phrase referring to appointment. It's almost as though 
one can read the mind of the draftsman in re-reading the section and 
adding the term "or employment 11 to be sure that all the positions referred 
to, some of which are elective and some appointive, were covered. 
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Since no one can obtain and hold any of those positions defined as exempt 
from the provision~ 0f the merit system (U.C.A. 67-13-1 et. seq.) except 
by appointment or election, the holder of such position "upon termination 
of such appointment or employment ... 11 who is not appointed must be 
elected. 
The District Court's construction of Sec. 67-5-11 in question is 
flawed because it fails to take into consideration the purpose of the 
Career Service Act. One of the most cardinal rules of statutory construc-
tion is to interpret a statute's language in the manner most consistent 
with the purpose of the statute so as to carry out the legislative intent. 
The specific purpose of the Career Service Act is spelled out clearly in 
Sec. 67-5-7 where it expressly states that its purpose is to "establish a 
career service system for attorneys employed by the office of the attorney 
general that will attract and retain attorneys of proven ability and exper-
ience who will devote full time to the service of the state. 11 Its method 
of accomplishing that purpose was three-fold: (1) make compensation com-
petitive with private practice (salaries were.raised an average of some 30% 
upon enactment of the law because the attorneys on career service could not 
thereafter practice law privately). Appellant, too, gave up his private 
practice upon being placed on career status (R. 7, 8); (2) provide job 
security (Sec. 67-5-12); (3) permit career attorneys to seek and hold 
political office without loss of their career status if the office was one 
that allowed this to be done (Sec. 67-5-13(2)). 
Obviously, if the purpose of the Career Service Act is to develop a 
career service program to attract and retain high calibre attorneys, it 
would be very strange indeed to compel an attorney to elect between 
rising to the very top of his career organization, namely becoming the 
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Attorney General and losing the financial security of his career status 
or remaining in a subordinate role in order to preserve that security. 
It should be noted that the Attorney General's Career Service Act 
grants to such attorneys an absolute right to become a candidate for 
political office. Sec. 67-5-13(2) states 11 upon application he 'shall 1 be 
granted leave without pay (emphasis added). 11 It is instructive, in order to 
draw necessary distinctions between merit employ ees and those persons sub-
ject to the provisions of U.C.A. 67-5-11, et. seq., to note that merit 
employees have no statutory right to a leave of absence to run for political 
office and be possibly thereafter in the employment of the State. See Sec. 
67-l9-19(l)(a). It is inconsistent for the legislature to grant attorneys 
preferred treatment with respect to becoming political candidates and then 
restrict their right to reinstatement after serving in an elective office 
to those rare situations in which a person is appointed to fill a vacancy 
in an elected office. Rather, we are compelled to employ the words 11 ••• 
or employment ... 11 in U.C.A. 67-5-11 to permit the intended circumstance 
of the re-employment of a staff member of the Attorney General 1 s office 
when that person was not selected by the electorate and was not therefore 
11 employed 11 by the State. 
Respondent argued below that the District Court would have to 11 alter 
the terms of the statutes 11 to rule in respondent 1 s favor ( R. 15). Respon-
dent's case relies on no such judicial activism; present statutory provisions support 
respondent's position. In fact the District Court had disregarded the words "or 
employment" in granting the Motion to Dismiss. This was error. 
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Respondent is not arguing that "appointment" means "elected." 
:Respondent simply points out that to accomplish the purposes for which 
this statute was enacted, it shouldn't and doesn't matter how the attorney came 
to serve in an exempt position. The first and most important consideration 
is that an attorney's service to the state is identical regardless of whether 
he is elected or appointed. Secondly, U.C.A. 67-5-11 addresses the exhaustive 
alternatives of an attorney who is terminated from a prior 11appointment or 
employment. 11 Thirdly, future benefit to the state based on that attorney's 
past experience would be the same whether that person was elected or 
appointed. 
Most significantly, any apparent conflict between the literal wording 
of the first reference to attaining the office (appointment only) and the 
second reference (appointment or election) is not a real confli~t. Both r~f­
erences should be harmonized because the first reference does not expressly 
exclude one who is elected, whereas the second clearly includes whose 
elected since one can attain such offices only by appointment or election. 
U.C.A. 67-5-11 clearly addresses the circumstance of any attorney who loses 
a prior state position, whether appointed or elected, and desires re-
instatement on the attorney general's staff from which he emerged when he 
was "appointed or employed." Furthermore, whenever there are two conflicting 
provisions, the subsequent provision normally prevails. Where, as here, both 
references became law simultaneously, it can fairly be said that the second 
reference was the last legislative expression since it was both written after 
and read after the first reference. More importantly it is much more con-
sonant with the entire purpose and intent of the subject law. 
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Respondent argued below that "the clear unambiguous meaning of the statute 
(67-5 ... ll)· does'-'tlot i.nclude an elected office 'as being an office to which a career 
status attorney in the Attorney General's office can aspire and retain the 
right to reinstatement" (R. 17). However, there is no basis to believe 
that the legislature intended to exclude any of the exempt offices specifically 
enumerated in Sec. 67-13-6 from applying to Sec. 67-5-11, the controlling 
statute. To reach such a conclusion, the B.istrict Court erroneously read 
into it such an exception as "except the elected offices listed in Sec. 
67-13-6(a)(l) and the first category of offices listed in Sec. 67-13-6(a)(2). 11 
Surprisingly the respondent's interpretation adopted by the lower court· 
excludes all elective offices in view of their contention that the subject 
statute "would bring into play Sec. 67-13-6(a)(2) but would not require rein-
statement of those elected to office referred to in 67-13-6(a)(l ) 11 (R. 14), 
particularly when respondent added the emphasis to the word 11e·1ective 11 when 
quoting from 67-13-6(a)(2) which includes ''persons appointed to fill vacancies 
in elective positions." In other words, all of the elective offices listed 
in (a)(l) qualify for exemption under either (a)(l) or (a)(2). Clearly the 
position is exempt whether it's filled by election or appointment. If it 
doesn't matter to the legislature whether the office is attained by election 
or appointment for purposes of classifying exempt positions as to the Merit 
Act generally, then why should it matter to the legislature how that office is 
attained when it is applied to a narrow range of state employees, to-wit, 
career attorneys? In fact, as noted above, the argument should be afortiori 
in support of those offices being treated the same way whether obtained by 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
the elective or the appointive route in view of the preferential treat-
ment of this category of employees with respect to their becoming 
candidates for elective office (see P. 5 above). 
Respondent's memorandum conjured up a chamber of horrors if appellant 
prevailed because of the alleged confusion that would obtain from blurring 
the distinction between "election" and "appointment" (R. 17). As stated 
above, the term "appointment or employment" alleviates any concern that 
the distinction between the words 11 electionn and "appointment" must be 
blurred by reversal of the order challenged by this appeal. Even if the 
second reference in 67-5-ll {11 appointment or employment") did not exist 
so the issue was whether or not "accepting appointment" includes being 
elected to an office within the meaning of the quoted term as applied to 
as 67-5-11, the result would only be a precedent for the use of that term 
as it is applied to that particular statute. Words have different meanings 
in different contexts. This is especially true when dealing with different 
statutes. Therefore, the constitutional provisions and statutes listed 
on R. 18 will not be impacted one iota, regardless of how the terms in 
question here are interpreted. 
Appellant certainly does not argue that to "elect" and to "appoint" 
are the same thing. Thus he has no quarrel with the definitions given 
those terms by the Supreme Courts of California and West Virginia quoted 
at length on R. 19 and 20. They simply are of no value in deciding the 
case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court of Salt Lake County erroneously interpreted 
Sec. 67-5-11, U.C.A. 1953, to apply only to attorneys who are appointed 
to exempt positions. The Order of December 22, 1981, should be vacated 
and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK S. GUSTAVSON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
630 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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